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The seeds of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center 
and Pentagon were planted over a decade ago when Iraqi tanks rolled into Kuwait on 
August 2, 1990.  The Iraqi invasion set into motion a series of events that intensified US-
Saudi security commitments and led to the first ever large-scale deployment of American 
troops on Saudi soil.  A decade after Desert Storm, over 3,500 US troops remain in the 
kingdom to enforce the southern No-Fly Zone.  The September attacks emphasize that 
our continued military presence and political policies in the Middle East are objectionable 
to both regional regimes and the larger Muslim community.  Deteriorating regional 
support for Iraqi sanctions and increased international desire for economic relations with 
Iran make America’s military presence appear hegemonic and self-serving.  This thesis 
explores the unintended consequences, or “blowback,” of US Middle East policy on 
American forces deployed to Saudi Arabia.  It does this by examining how Islamist 
militant’s ability to attack US military targets within Saudi Arabia increases under Saudi 
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The United States has already felt “blowback” from its Middle East policies with 
militant attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, the OPM/SANG building, 
Khobar Towers, the Kenya and Tanzania embassies, and the USS Cole.  One can expect 
further “blowback” from American policy and presence since neither has changed and 
“anti-American” militant rhetoric remains as fervent and defiant as ever.  Consequently, 
the aftermath of these attacks—like the strikes in Afghanistan—can lead to further 
reprisals as US officials seek out militant terrorists in an effort to bring them to justice. 
A strong Saudi economy and the regime’s ability to co-opt opposition is the 
linchpin in maintaining the security of deployed American forces.  It is likely any 
political change in Saudi Arabia will result in the emergence of an Islamist, anti-Western 
regime.  Reducing the public sector workforce, trimming subsidies, and increasing 
undesirable private sector jobs could fuse radical Islamist opposition forces leading to a 
focused, powerful political adversary. 
The real threat our deployed military faces is the role American policy plays in 
increasing popular collaboration for militant attacks against US forces in Saudi Arabia.  
While American sanctions will not prompt state sponsorship of terrorist’s attacks against 
deployed US forces, Dual Containment, coupled with our support for Israel, intensifies 
regional opposition to our policies and presence.  Dual Containment fails to achieve its 
objectives and increases Arab sympathy for Iraqi and Iranian civilians whom they view 
as victims of duplicitous American aggression.  As countries rush to re-establish 
economic trade ties with Iran and Iraq, American pressure to continue or tighten 
sanctions only serves to isolate the United States.  Smuggling operations are 
progressively multiplying making sanctions increasingly irrelevant.   
The key to controlling popular collusion in Islamist militant attacks is the Saudi 
regime’s ability to co-opt or eliminate its opposition.  Islamist militants, because of their 
anti-western ideology and desire to overthrow unjust, un-Islamic regimes, will always be 
a threat.  While America cannot eliminate its support for gulf regimes, we can alleviate 
pressure on them by reducing our military “footprint” eventually returning to an “over-
the-horizon” security arraignment.  American forces deployed to the Middle East are at 
 xi
risk because of militant determination to drive the US out of the Muslim Holy Land.  A 
reduced American military presence in Saudi Arabia would allow us to maintain our 
commitment to Saudi security, prevent Iraq from threatening its neighbors, and lessen the 
potential for terrorist attacks.  It also prevents Iran and Iraq from using our presence as 
propaganda to inflame regional opposition.   
 xii
I. ESTABLISHING THE THREAT  
A. FRAMEWORK   
The dramatic terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 
September 11, 2001 by Islamic militants announced to America that our pre-eminence in 
world affairs does not come without a price.  Similarly, our strikes against Afghanistan’s 
Taliban regime and its terrorist training camps remind the world that the US military is a 
key feature of American foreign policy and holds an asymmetric advantage over most of 
its adversaries.  A military advantage so superior in some cases, it can instigate or trigger 
terrorist attacks.  This research explores the repercussions of American Middle East 
policy on the US military in Saudi Arabia.  It follows the basic premise of “blowback” 
posited by Chalmers Johnson in his book Blowback: The Cost and Consequences of 
American Empire.  In his book, Johnson defines “blowback” as the unintended 
consequences of American policies.1  Due to the complexities of foreign policy and the 
secretive nature of terrorist operational planning, the source and causes of reprisal actions 
is often difficult to trace.  Therefore, this research seeks to establish how internal Saudi 
economic policies combine with US Middle East policies to increase state and/or popular 
collusion in terrorist attacks against American forces stationed in Saudi Arabia.   
This paper examines how the capability to carry out attacks against US military 
targets in Saudi Arabia can increase due to Saudi economic reform and the US policy of 
Dual Containment.  The linchpin in maintaining the US military’s security in Saudi 
Arabia is the Saudi regime’s ability to suppress or co-opt opposition forces within their 
country.  Despite the overwhelming need to reform and privatize their economy, given 
their growing population and plummeting per capita income, Saudi efforts to implement 
“real” reform can lead to disastrous consequences.  Therefore, any significant economic 
liberalization efforts only serve to hinder the regime’s ability to maintain internal security 
which increases the threat to US forces. 
The US policy of Dual Containment towards Iraq and Iran is becoming unpopular 
and unsupported within the region and around the world.  This calls into question the 
                                                 
1 Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2000), 223. 
1 
United States’ reason for maintaining their military presence in the Gulf.  America claims 
our military presence ensures regional stability; however, regional and international 
rhetoric espouses our presence only serves to maintain US regional hegemony.  Aligning 
Islamic militant and state causes is vital since terrorists increasingly need larger explosive 
devices and increased operational sophistication to counter improved force protection 
measures.2  Regional terrorists have demonstrated the ability to execute attacks using 
large explosive devices in the bombings of Khobar Towers, the USS Cole, and the 
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.  State support of terrorist acts facilitates this 
type of attack due to superior resources and logistics.  As a basis for exploring these 
areas, this chapter establishes our national interests in the Middle East and the primary 
threat to our forces. 
B. AMERICA’S MIDDLE EAST INTERESTS  
The Middle East has been a vital strategic region to the United States for the 
better part of the last half-century.  Our interests have included preventing Soviet 
expansion into the region during the Cold War, ensuring the security of Israel, and 
guaranteeing access to the region’s vast oil deposits.  This area of the world has seen 
every American President since Harry Truman establish a doctrine or policy defining the 
strategic relevance of the region to US national interests.  President Clinton defined 
America’s current Middle East interests and laid out two objectives for his 
administration, support the peace process and contain Iran and Iraq—or “Dual 
Containment.”  President Clinton’s administration saw these objectives as mutually 
reinforcing.3  In practice, this policy has amounted to securing the safety of Israel and 
controlling oil resources by supporting and protecting friendly regional regimes.  So far, 
the Bush Administration has followed the same policies as its predecessor and has only 
spoken about the need to revise and institute “smart, effective sanctions” against Iraq.  
The Bush Administration, however, has neither outlined nor instituted any policy 
changes.  The question of which interest, Israel’s security or access to oil, takes precedent 
                                                 
2 Anthony H. Cordesman, Transnational Threats from the Middle East: Crying Wolf or Crying Havoc, 
(Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999),  72. 
3 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scrowcroft, and Richard Murphy, “Differentiated Containment.” 
Foreign Affairs, (May-June 1997), 21. 
2 
is arguable but, for the purposes of this research, the important point is America has 
committed military forces to ensure the latter.     
United States enjoys a strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia that dates back to 
the Second World War.  The Kingdom came to the forefront of US Middle East policy in 
the early 1970’s under the Nixon administration.  Saudi Arabia was the “second pillar”–
Iran being the first–in Nixon’s “Twin Pillar” policy that relied on regional powers to 
solve regional conflicts and prevent the Soviet Union from gaining a foothold in the 
Persian Gulf.  When Iraqi tanks rolled into Kuwait on August 2, 1990, it set into motion a 
series of events that intensified US-Saudi security commitments and established the 
United States as the pre-eminent power in the region.  With the fall of the Soviet Union, 
America no longer feared Soviet intrusion in the Middle East and was less hesitant to 
intervene in the region to protect its national interests.  This led to the first ever large-
scale deployment of American troops to Saudi soil in over fifty years of US-Saudi 
security arrangements.  More than 3,500 troops and 200 aircraft remain in the kingdom 
today to enforce the southern No-Fly Zone over Iraq.  Several Middle East observers 
claim this ensures America’s position as the unquestioned hegemon in the region.4  
Middle East analyst Gregory Gause asserts:5  
Dual Containment prevents any power from supplanting the United States 
as the dominant force protecting Saudi Arabia and smaller monarchies 
from outside threats.  It disavows any need for political relationships with 
Iran or Iraq, and it allows for a larger US unilateral role in managing 
gulf affairs. 
America’s Dual Containment policy means the United States must maintain a 
military presence in the Persian Gulf and puts it in the unenviable position as the 
guarantor of regional stability.6  Stationing forces in Saudi Arabia allows the US to carry 
out its regional policies and provide security to the Saudi regime from its long feared 
neighbors, Iran and Iraq.  Iraq emerged as the number one threat to Saudi Arabia when it 
                                                 
4 Gary Sick, “The United States in the Persian Gulf: From Twin Pillars to Dual Containment,” Edited 
by David W. Lesch in The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment. 
(Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), 277. 
5 Gregory F. Gause,  “The Illogic of Dual Containment.”  Foreign Affairs, (March-April 1994): 13. 
6 Martin Indyk, Graham Fuller, Anthony Cordesman, and Phebe Marr.  “Symposium on Dual 
Containment: US Policy Towards Iran and Iraq.”  Middle East Policy, (Winter 1994): 12-15. 
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invaded Kuwait a decade ago and laid claim to Saudi territory.  However, with dwindling 
regional support for Iraqi sanctions and an increased desire to establish economic 
relations with Iran, the American military presence, in the Arab mind, appears 
increasingly hegemonic and self-serving.  This perception leads to questions about why 
the Saudi regime maintains the US military’s presence in Saudi Arabia.  The Arab public 
openly wonders whether America is there to protect Saudi Arabia from Iraq or to 
preserve the regime. 
C. BACKLASH TO US PRESENCE  
The United States is a prime target for “blowback” since it is the lone “imperial” 
power, supports repressive regimes, and is the largest arms dealer in the world.7  
Nowhere is this more evident than in the Middle East.  First, the US avoided direct, full-
scale involvement in the region until after the fall of the Soviet Union.  Prior to that, our 
commitment focused primarily on preventing Soviet incursions.  Second, most Middle 
East states have repressive regimes with high authoritarianism regardless of whether the 
ruler is called King, Sheikh, Sultan, President, General, or Ayatollah—and Saudi Arabia 
is no exception.8  Lastly, in the last six years, slightly more than 85 percent of all Saudi 
arms deals involved purchasing US weapons.9  Attacks on US forces could themselves 
breed additional “blowback.”  It is unknown what repercussions the US faces for its 
indictment of 13 Saudi nationals implicated in the Khobar Towers bombing or for the 
Saudi execution of four nationals in connection with the bombing of the Headquarters of 
the US Army Material Command’s Office of the Program Manager for the Saudi Arabian 
National Guard (OPM/SANG) that killed five Americans.10  America’s Middle East 
policy often involves short-term “crisis management” fixes rather than long-term 
strategic policies which, by definition, contribute to “blowback.” 
                                                 
7 Johnson, 11. 
8 Anthony H. Cordesman, Transnational Threats from the Middle East: Crying Wolf or Crying Havoc, 
4. 
9 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and Transition; US Policy Ten Years After the Gulf War: The 
Challenge of Southern Gulf Alliances, [Online]: http://www.csis.org/gulf/reports/subsoutherngulf.pdf [6 
Feb 01], 46. 
10 Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 1. 
4 
The American military in Saudi Arabia is particularly at risk because it represents 
the pre-eminent symbol of American power projection in the region.  Attacks on US 
forces can also substitute for less popular attacks on Mid-East regimes.11  In addition, 
America is inextricably tied to Israel in the Middle East Peace Process and settlement 
breakdowns make Americans a target either out of frustration or in an effort to further 
destroy the process.12  Several American presidents have publicly acknowledged the 
“special relationship” the US has with Israel which fans the flames of Arab discontent.  
Arab resentment towards America’s “pro-Israeli” leanings came to a head recently with, 
former US Ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk’s remarks stating, “I do blame 
[Palestinian Leader Yasser] Arafat for resorting to violence…he allowed the situation to 
get out of control…I hope the Jewish state triumphs over its enemies.”13  This prompted 
the understandable Arab outcry that American diplomats were “supporters of Israel 
masquerading as impartial mediators.”14  Simon Karim, former Lebanese ambassador to 
the United States, said, referring to American policy, “[E]vents are unfolding [that are] 
playing right into the hands of the ‘bin Ladins’.”15  Middle East Peace Process 
breakdowns also increase the already mounting pressure on the Saudi regime to end 
America’s military presence. 
Islamists view the stationing of US troops near two of Islam’s holiest sites, Mecca 
and Medina, as untenable and a corruption of the Islamic faith.  American support for 
Israel, especially in times of crisis, only serves to exacerbate this view.  No country in the 
region represents a significant military threat to United States and the few direct actions 
between the US and regional militaries, namely Iran and Iraq, have proven calamitous for 
the regional actors.  Therefore, based on historical evidence, the greatest threats to US 
forces in the region are terrorist attacks perpetrated by Islamic militants. 
                                                 
11 Anthony H. Cordesman, Transnational Threats from the Middle East: Crying Wolf or Crying 
Havoc, 66. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Lee Hockstader, “U.S. Diplomat’s Dream Deferred: Ambassador leaves Israel with Lament and 
Anger at Arafat,” Washington Post, 15 Jul 2001 [Online]: http://washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/world/mideast/A63250-2001Jul14.html [19 Jul 01], A16. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Howard Schneider, “US Losses Clout in the Arab World: Role as Peace Broker Under Attack,” 
Washington Post, 6 Jul 2001 [Online]: http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/world/mideast/A23059-
2001Jul15.html [19 Jul 01], A15. 
5 
D. ISLAMIST THREAT 
The World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks are by far the deadliest and most 
dramatic Islamist militant strikes against America, but they are neither the first nor will 
they be the last.  On November 13, 1995, a car bomb detonated outside the Headquarters 
of the US Army Material Command’s OPM/SANG building in Saudi Arabia causing 67 
casualties including five American military advisors.16  It was the first attack against 
Americans in Saudi Arabia since assailants wounded two servicemen on a shuttle bus in 
Jeddah in 1991.  Several Islamic militant groups claimed responsibility for the attack 
including the Movement for Islamic Change in the Arabian Peninsula-Jihad Wing, Tigers 
of the Gulf, and Combatant Partisans of God.  On June 25, 1996, a truck bomb, equal in 
power to 10 tons of TNT, exploded outside Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia 
killing 19 US Air Force personnel and injuring 60 others.17  Islamic militant groups also 
claimed responsibility for this attack.  US and Saudi intelligence reports indicate these 
attackers benefited from the cooperation and complicity of Saudi nationals opposed to 
“infidels” in the holy land.  The common thread among these groups is their call for the 
removal of US forces from the Arabian Peninsula.18   
In 1998, terrorists bombed the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and in 
2000, they attacked the USS Cole in a Yemeni port.  While not occurring on Saudi soil, 
American intelligence has linked the USS Cole and embassy attacks to Saudi terrorist 
financier Usama bin Ladin whose expressed goal is the removal of US military forces 
from the Arabian Peninsula.  These events confirm the presence of a dangerous militant 
element in the region willing and able to carrying out attacks against US civilian and 
military targets.  A 1997 Defense Science Board Report for the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Technology stated, “Historical data shows a strong 
correlation between US involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist 
attacks against the US.  In addition, the military asymmetry that denies…the ability to 
                                                 
16 Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom, (Colorado: Westview Press, 
1997), 41.  
17 Mustafa Alani and Andrew Rathmell, “A Cruel Testimony to Fundamentalist Sentiments,” in Jane's 
Intelligence Review, Special Report No. 12., ed., Robert Hall and Peter Felstead,  (United Kingdom: 
Thomson Publishing Company, 1996), 18. 
18 Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom, 42. 
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engage in overt attacks drives the use of transnational actors (terrorists from one country 
attacking in another.).”19  Islamic militants attack America because of our western values, 
for "corrupting" Islamic countries, and for supporting oppressive, secular regimes.20  
Militant ideology alone puts US forces at risk; American policy that weakens the Saudi 
ability to provide security or strengthens external support only amplifies this threat.   
The term “Islamic Militants” or “Militantism” separates this specific, unique term 
from the more common, misused term Islamic Fundamentalist.  Any deviation in this 
research from this term is intentional.  The term Islamic Militant in this sense separates 
active, violent individuals and organizations, the so-called “bomb-throwers” who operate 
under the guise of Islamic righteousness and resort to acts of terror to achieve their 
objectives, from mainstream Islamic movements.  Mainstream Islamic movements strive 
to enhance their sense of empowerment in facing repressive regimes they see as 
increasingly Western and Zionist.21  In the words of Hasan al-Banna, founder of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, “The objective is to create a new Muslim human being brought 
about through moral and spiritual rearmament, economic development, justice, and free 
of foreign domination.”22  Most, if not all, of these groups are patently anti-Western and 
many groups or individuals can transition from mainstream to militantism.  Generally, 
mainstream Islamists seek justice within their own country either through reforming the 
regime or abolishing it.  For our purposes, Islamic militantism refers to individuals and 
organizations that espouse anti-American ideology, operate under the pretext of Islamic 
purity, and resort to violence to achieve their objectives.  Currently, the most outspoken 
and apparently most dangerous Islamic militant in the region is Saudi millionaire Usama 
bin Ladin. 
The United States has seemingly linked every attack against Americans in the 
region in the last six years to Usama bin Ladin or to his al-Qa’ida (the base) organization.  
                                                 
19 Johnson, 9. 
20 Anthony H. Cordesman, Transnational Threats from the Middle East: Crying Wolf or Crying 
Havoc, 67. 
21 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, “Islamist Perception of US Policy in the Middle East,” Edited by David 
W. Lesch in The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment, (Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1999), 433. 
22 Ibid. 
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The US also implicated him in the Kenya and Tanzania embassy bombings.  Much of bin 
Ladin's rage against America stems from the Saudi government’s decision to allow the 
US military into the country.23  Bin Ladin considers the US presence an “occupation of 
the holy land” and issued an infamous “fatwa” in 1998 calling on every Muslim to “kill 
Americans and their allies, civilian and military.”24  He further states, “It is the individual 
duty [to kill Americans] of every Muslim who can do it…in order for them to move their 
armies out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.”25  
Ironically, Islamic Fundamentalism and Militantism are fragmented ideologies as their 
causes usually seek to supplant an unjust regime.  A brief description of some of the 
major regional Islamic militant groups supports this assertion.26  
al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG) – Egyptian Islamic group 
dedicated to overthrowing Hosni Mubarak’s government and replacing it 
with an Islamic state.  Primarily operates in southern Egypt but has 
support in Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban areas.  They consider Sheikh 
Umar abd-al Rahman, who is in a US prison for his role in the World 
Trade Center bombing, their ultimate spiritual leader.  Their primary 
targets are Egyptian security forces, tourists, Coptic Christians, and 
Egyptian mid and low-level political opponents of their movement.  They 
also have ties to Usama bin Ladin and his organizational networks.   
 
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) – Outgrowth of the Muslim 
Brotherhood whose goal is to establish an Islamic Palestinian State in 
Israel.  Their primary operating area is in the occupied territories with 
their strength concentrated in the Gaza Strip and a few areas of the West 
Bank.  They attack Israeli military and civilian targets, suspected 
collaborators, and Fatah rivals. 
 
Hizballah (Party of God) – Strongly anti-Western radical Shi’a group 
dedicated to the creation of an Iranian style Islamic Republic in Lebanon 
and the removal of all non-Islamic influences from the area.  Their 
primary operating area is the Beka’a Valley, the southern suburbs of 
Beirut, and southern Lebanon.  The US implicated them in the 1983 US 
marine barracks and 1984 US embassy annex bombings in Lebanon.  They 
                                                 
23 Staff, “An Elusive Enemy: The US Presence in Saudi Arabia fuels Usama bin Ladin’s Jihad,” 
CNN.com, 2001.  [Online]: http://fyi.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf.war/legacy/bin.ladin/index.html [9 
May 01], 2. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Descriptions taken from: Anthony H. Cordesman, Transnational Threats from the Middle East: 
Crying Wolf or Crying Havoc, 83. 
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are also responsible for numerous kidnappings and detentions of US 
citizens in Beirut.   
 
al-Jihad – al-Jihad has similar goals and operating areas as the IG, but 
they focus their attacks on high-level Egyptian officials.  This organization 
carried out the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.  
This group has allegedly recently merged with bin Ladin’s al-Qa’ida 
network. 
 
al-Qa’ida, International Islamic Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, 
Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy Shrines – Some of the 
organizations and activities led or financed by Usama bin Ladin.  Their 
goal is to attack “enemies of Islam” and they are hostile to Shiites, Middle 
Eastern secular movements, and western culture.  They operate out of 
Afghanistan but support Islamic militants in Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, 
Somalia, Yemen, and Kosovo.  Bin Ladin formed the International Islamic 
Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders in 1998 and it includes al-Qa’ida, IG, 
al-Jihad, and three other groups.  The United States tied Bin Ladin, and his 
various organizations, to the World Trade Center, Pentagon, OPM/SANG, 
and USS Cole attacks.  The Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy 
Shrines also claimed responsibility for the Kenya and Tanzania embassy 
bombings.  
There are also numerous secular, anti-US terrorist organizations, mostly 
Palestinian groups, operating in the Middle East, but they do not garner the popular 
support outside their country that Islamic groups do.  The organizations listed above 
illustrate how most movements, while being anti-US, primarily seek to overthrow 
regional regimes.  The only exception may be bin Ladin and his groups, but even he 
seeks to overthrow the Saudi regime and most of his affiliates come from groups that 
desire to oust other regional governments.  In this regard, Islamic Fundamentalism and 
Militantism are indigenous or imported (vice exported) causes. 
To illustrate this further, US and Saudi officials do not consider Shi’a minority 
militants in Saudi Arabia a threat without external state collusion, most notably from 
Iran.  Also, Shiite minorities prefer the existing Saudi regime to Sunni militant or 
fundamentalist opposition groups.27  Usama bin Ladin’s family emigrated from 
Hadramawat in Yemen making him “non-tribal” and calling his “Saudiness” into 
question.28  Muhammad al-Mas’ari, the leader of the prominent Saudi fundamentalist 
                                                 
27 Fandy, 5. 
28 Ibid. 
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opposition group Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR),29 is a khadiri 
with no tribal lineage and, therefore, a lower social standing.30  Despite the fact he is a 
Sunni Najdi, Sa’d al-Fiqih, head of the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia 
(MIRA),31 is marginal in Saudi society because he has spent most of his time in the 
Zubair region of Iraq.32  Saudi Arabia further fragments indigenous Islamic opposition 
by either coercive suppression or co-option.  In fact, the two leading Saudi 
fundamentalist opposition groups, the CDLR and MIRA, are headquartered in London.  
The ability to control Arab opposition forces is dependant on a strong central Saudi 















                                                 
29 Their central vision is the idea that Islam and its values are under attack both locally and globally 
and that the Saudi government has failed to protect Islam and Muslims. 
30 Fandy, 5. 
31 Usama bin Ladin’s former associates. 
32 Fandy, 5.  
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II. SAUDI ECONOMIC REFORM  
A. THREAT OF REFORM  
Saudi Arabia’s economic reform efforts will likely fuse and intensify public 
opposition to the America’s military presence in the country.  The Saudi Arabian 
government’s program to diversify and liberalize its economy will force Saudi nationals 
to lose their public sector jobs or take lower paying, labor intensive, private sector jobs.  
This will worsen the population’s attitude towards the American presence in Saudi 
Arabia because of popular belief the US military’s role is to preserve the Sa’ud regime.  
Saudi economic reform may create an organized and fervent political outcry potentially 
resulting in Islamic militant terrorist attacks on US military targets in Saudi Arabia.  
Saudi Arabia controls the world’s largest oil reserves and can single-handedly 
influence world oil prices; however, falling oil revenues over the last decade forced the 
Saudi government to undertake economic liberalization (intifah) and reform measures.  
These reforms included diversification, increased privatization, and the reduction of 
foreign nationals from the private sector workforce.  Economic reform reduces the 
number of high-paying, non-productive public sector jobs–a perceived right of Saudi 
citizens–and increases the number of low paying private sector jobs.  Private sector jobs 
largely involve menial labor and thus diminish an individual’s status since one’s social 
standing is often tied to the type of work one does.  As economic reform affects one’s 
wealth and social standing, popular rhetoric will increasingly become anti-regime and 
anti-American.  An obvious and available scapegoat is the US military stationed in Saudi 
Arabia since they are seen as a tool of the regime used to maintain its grip on power. 
Terrorists have carried out two well-publicized attacks against US forces in Saudi 
Arabia and economic reform impacting the quality of life for Saudi nationals could 
spawn increased complicity between these societal elements.  These attacks have led to 
speculation US servicemen are more at risk stationed in Saudi Arabia now than they were 
fighting Iraq in 1991.33  While this may be an exaggeration, these attacks do confirm the 
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presence of a dangerous extremist element, often cloaked in Islamic fundamentalist 
ideology, able to carry out attacks against US military targets in Saudi Arabia.  The Saudi 
regime has successfully co-opted major opposition forces and deterred resistance to their 
policies by buying their way out of trouble.  For the most part, they have been successful 
at keeping potential enemies fragmented and distracted preventing widespread, organized 
hostility towards both the regime and the US military presence.  Should the regime 
undertake economic reforms that create a growing group of disenfranchised citizens, 
these embittered nationals could join forces with violent elements in an organized attack 
against the regime and their “guardians”—the US military.  Given the potential dangers 
endemic in Saudi economic reform, why should Saudi Arabia give it a second thought? 
B. ECONOMIC REFORM IN A RENTIER STATE  
A rentier state does not rely on local revenue extraction (taxes) to accumulate 
wealth but spends capital inflows generated by the sale of a commodity as their primary 
economic activity.  State and local institutions, therefore, emerge not to extract wealth, 
but to spend it.34  Leaders of rentier states use the inflow of capital from the sale of a 
resource—generally oil in the case of most Middle Eastern states—to “buy out” their 
opposition and abstain from taxing their citizens.  By eliminating taxation, regimes free 
themselves from creating a social contract with their citizens against a backdrop of 
popular coercion.35  The “power of the purse” extends the reach of the state and gives 
regimes the ability to co-opt social coalitions by convincing them to trade power for 
wealth.36  Rentier state structures transform the adage “no taxation without 
representation” into “no representation without taxation.”  Due to the centralized 
accumulation of revenues in a rentier structured economy, massive state intervention in 
economic activities ranging from employment to price setting is paramount.37  As a 
result, these regimes view broad based economic reform and privatization strategies as 
highly suspect and politically destabilizing.38  
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Political loyalty in a rentier state is not based on an ideological belief in the 
validity of the system but on the ability of the system to provide for the material needs of 
its citizens.  Governments in rentier states seek rents externally and distribute the 
proceeds to its populace thus trading popular political participation for financial security.  
In contrast to states that extract rents through taxation and whose citizens exercise a great 
degree of popular sovereignty, rentier states make no fiscal demands on their populations 
and expect popular apathy towards the political process.  Since a disproportionate amount 
of state revenues come from the sale of a single commodity, economic wealth ebbs and 
flows with the fluctuating market price of this commodity.  Citizens of rentier states tie 
political loyalty to the government’s ability to provide material goods.  As a result, 
regime survival is dependant on the strength of the state’s economy and the government’s 
ability to maintain control of revenue producing mechanisms.  Rentier state regimes, 
therefore, view economic reform, privatization, and liberalization as a threat to its control 
over state economic resources that will eventually weaken or destroy the regime’s 
political hegemony.      
Saudi Arabia’s economy fits this profile better than almost any other country.  
The Saudi monarchy has created a vertical patronage network that provides for the well 
being of almost every member of society.  This network offers everything from public 
sector jobs to outright financial handouts.  In return, the Saudi regime requires popular 
capitulation with regards to the affairs of state.  Providing its citizens with their every 
need puts and enormous burden on the Saudi economy; therefore, its economy cannot 
afford to fail because the livelihood of every Saudi citizen fails with it.  However, the 
Saudi economy cannot privatize or diversify because they lack natural resources (besides 
oil), disciplined legal regulatory regimes, and adequate private or foreign investment 
capital.   A rentier structured economy puts power in the hands of the ruling regime 
which maintains power by dominating the economic arena.  This further complicates 
reform since privatization and diversification weakens the regime’s monopoly on 
economic and political power.   
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Rentier structured political economies demand elaborate government planning 
efforts that often result in economic stagnation and low productivity.  Saudi Arabia’s 
economic success is solely dependent on and affected by international oil prices.   
According to analyst Alan Richards, the core problems of political economies, especially 
in Saudi Arabia, are restoring or maintaining economic growth, restraining population 
expansion, creating jobs, unconstrained urbanization, saving water, obtaining food, and 
halting environmental destruction.39  The rentier structure of the Saudi economy begets a 
political economy rife with these problems. 
1. Economic Situation40 
Saudi Arabia controls one-fourth of the world's proven oil reserves and will likely 
remain the world's largest oil producer for the foreseeable future.  Oil sales make up 
about 95 percent of total Saudi export earnings and about 40 percent of the country's 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  The country’s economic outlook has improved since 
1999 due to the sharp rebound in world oil prices.  The expected real GDP growth for 
2000 is about 7.6 percent with an estimated 2001 increase, assuming relatively strong oil 
prices, of four percent.  Saudi Arabia needs strong economic growth to keep up with a 
rapidly increasing (and young – half are under age 18) population and to create jobs for 
them outside the public sector. 
In October 1999, Saudi Oil Minister Naimi stated that Saudi Arabia’s oil policy is 
based on four facts: Saudi Arabia’s large oil reserves and low production costs, its 
significant spare oil production capacity, its close linkage between the national economy 
and the oil industry, and its stable political and economic system.  Naimi also stressed the 
importance of “a stable international oil market” where “wide and rapid swings in prices 
are undesirable.”  Saudi Arabia’s economy is indeed tied exclusively to oil revenues and 
even with their production capacity, proven reserves, and the upsurge in world oil prices, 
their dependence on this commodity leaves them vulnerable to market fluctuations 
demonstrating the need for economic diversity. 
2. Need for Reform  
The Kingdom’s patronage-based welfare state economy is straining at the seams 
and in dire need of disciplined reform.41  According to Anthony Cordesman, population 
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growth and dependence on foreign labor may be the two biggest threats to Saudi regime 
stability.42  Saudi Arabia continues to face pressure to diversify its economy through 
privatization, industrialization, financial reform, and increased foreign investment.  Over 
the past two decades Saudi economic growth has fallen behind population growth, 
resulting in sharply reduced per capita incomes and high unemployment (some estimates 
put Saudi unemployment figures over 25 percent).43  Due to depressed oil prices 
throughout much of the 1990s, Saudi Arabia is currently experiencing high domestic 
debt–around 75 percent of GDP–which it hopes to pay down by 2005–again, assuming 
oil prices remain strong.44   
The Saudi government dominates the industrial sector.  It owns the main 
petrochemical refineries and has 70 percent ownership of the Saudi Arabia Basic Industry 
Corporation (SABIC).45  The government also owns the Saudi Arab-American Oil 
Company (ARAMCO) controlling 97 percent of crude oil production, all natural gas 
production, and has a monopoly on all upstream oil development.46  The Saudi 
Industrialization Development Fund (SIDF), which provides concessionary loans for 
private investment, heavily subsidizes the start-up and operations costs (electricity, water, 
machinery, and production inputs) of most private industries.47  The Saudi government’s 
attempt to diversify through industrial development has centered on light manufacturing 
and construction materials (steel plants, fertilizers, domestic/export oriented refineries, 
and petrochemical complexes).  The government creates investment incentives by 
exempting investors from import taxes on machinery, instituting protective tariffs, 
providing easy financial terms, ensuring long-term leasing at nominal rates, and, best of 
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all, guaranteeing a 15 year supply of crude oil.48  Slow industrial growth and high 
production costs keep Saudi industry from being competitive on the world market.  
Petroleum and petroleum products still account for 40 percent of the GDP, 75 percent of 
government revenues, and 95 percent of export receipts.49  The Saudi government has 
had limited success at industrialization mostly due to the lack of a comprehensive 
industrial strategy, an undeveloped economic framework, and an inappropriate selection 
of industrialization projects.50  
Over the last few decades, Saudi Arabia has committed a substantial amount of 
time and resources developing their agricultural industry.  With little arable land, this 
endeavor requires heavy government subsidies including covering half the costs of 
fertilizer and equipment and the entire cost of pesticides and cattle importation.51  Wheat 
production is especially important to the Saudi economy because Saudi Arabia considers 
it a strategic commodity–since the US threatened a wheat embargo in the early 1970s 
against Arab countries if they imposed an oil embargo on the US–and the government 
would have to create thousands of public sector jobs if they did not encourage wheat 
production.52  Saudi agricultural production serves political rather than economic 
objectives and survives only with heavy subsides.53  State subsidies and losses by 
unprofitable state-owned enterprises are large contributors to Saudi Arabia's huge budget 
deficit.54  The government’s challenge is to develop the ability to produce and sell 
competitively despite limited raw materials and manpower, high labor and management 
costs, restricted home and overseas markets, limited tariff protection against foreign 
goods, and inadequate training programs that do not prepare the indigenous population 
for meaningful work in the private industrial sector.55  
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In an effort to decrease unemployment and reliance on foreign labor, Saudi 
Arabia, in a program known as “Saudization,” has asked private companies to increase 
their employment of Saudi nationals by 25 percent over the coming year, and then by 5 
percent per year thereafter.  The private sector accounts for about 40 percent of Saudi 
Arabia's GDP but only five to ten percent of its employees are Saudi nationals.56  The 
government employs over 40 percent of the country’s labor force and, with a 25 percent 
unemployment rate and population growth outpacing GDP growth, the demand on the 
government to create jobs increases exponentially as its ability to fund these jobs 
decreases rapidly.  The goal of Saudization is to increase employment of its own citizens 
by replacing 60 percent of the estimated 7.2 million foreign workers in the country.  In 
order to achieve this goal, Saudi Arabia increased the cost of hiring expatriates by 
mandating compulsory healthcare for foreign workers and raising the renewal fee for 
certain work visas.57  They have also made an investment in developing their human 
capital by creating and improving training programs to prepare Saudi nationals for work 
in the private sector.  So far, integrating local workers into the private sector workforce 
has proven difficult, if not impossible.  Local workers are still more expensive to hire 
than expatriate workers (often demanding six times as much as foreigners), they have 
difficulty integrating into the workforce, and they feel they will lose prestige and political 
influence by accepting private sector work.58  Also, the Saudi government only issues 
foreign workers one-year visas, foreigners are not entitled to citizenship, and the 
employer has few obligations to the worker (the work permit is issued to the company for 
a specific occupation so the worker has no lateral mobility).59  In addition to these 
failures and difficulties reforming the economy, the Saudi government faces other reform 
challenges. 
3. Obstacles to Reform  
The most common constraint on economic development in Saudi Arabia is the 
lack of political will to institute reforms that may lead to economic adversity for its 
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citizens and cause political problems for the regime.  Saudi Arabia’s economic reform 
has progressed slowly due to fears of job losses and resistance from members of the 
Saudi royal family–particularly Prince Abdullah.60  To date, there has not been a single 
sale of state assets to private control and privatization has largely been limited to 
allowing private firms to take on certain service functions.61  Saudi Arabia has also 
moved slowly on subsidy cuts, tax increases, and financial sector reforms.62  With 
decreased oil revenues in the 1980s and 1990s, the Saudi government, rather than cut 
spending, increased borrowing and began running budget deficits.  In 1989, the Saudi 
deficit was 23 percent of GDP; in 1994, it was 75 percent; and in 1995, they managed to 
lower it to 3.2 percent (mostly due to cuts in security and defense spending, manpower 
development, and subsides).63  However, in 1996, despite moderate cuts in health, social, 
and municipal services, the deficit increased demonstrating the regime’s unwillingness to 
impose severe austerity measures on its citizens.64  Middle East Analyst, Barbara Conry 
outlines the reason for the regime’s reluctance to undertake serious economic reforms this 
way, “[T]he generosity of the welfare state is one of the primary means by which the 
repressive gulf regime stifles dissent among its citizenry making the necessary cuts in 
social spending an immense political risk.”65  Saudi Arabia also suffers from severe 
infrastructure difficulties that impede successful industrialization. 
Saudi Arabia is a small market country with widely dispersed producers resulting 
in high transportation costs and limited opportunities for production-based export trade.66  
Saudi Arabia lacks the components necessary to develop a diversified economy and the 
capital start-up costs of industry prohibit private sector investment.67  There is no 
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industrial option open to the country giving it anywhere near the return of oil sector 
investments.68  This hinders the regime’s efforts to expand its private sector and forces it 
to make “quick fixes” to alleviate its employment problems and prevent hardships for its 
citizens.  As economist Robert Looney puts it, “To develop public sector jobs, it is only 
necessary to build a room and put a desk in it; developing a job in the modern industrial 
sector involves importing machinery and finding a skilled workforce.”69  Finding or 
developing a skilled, indigenous workforce is another formidable obstacle the Saudi 
regime must overcome. 
Saudi Arabia has made great strides in improving its adult literacy rate–currently 
around 62 percent–but most are not educated to compete in the modern world economy.  
The Saudi education system is heavily Islamic and produces a disproportionate number of 
Islamic Studies PhDs.  So many in fact, most of the regional Islamic governments refuse 
to recognize their credentials.70  Saudis seek jobs with secured high incomes and low 
productivity expectations.  Society does not encourage enrollment in trade schools since 
they feel this only prepares one for manual labor professions.71  The Saudi financial 
system is almost as unprepared for private enterprise as its education system. 
The Saudi financial system cannot support private investment or business 
ventures and it lacks the regulatory discipline to attract foreign investors.  The major 
criticisms of Saudi private financial institutions are there are too few of them to support 
economic development; they lack asset control by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency; 
commercial banks focus on lending to stable, developed foreign economies; and they 
cannot compete with cheap financing from government lending institutions.72  The lack 
of viable financial institutions, regulatory laws, and the fear of change drive foreign and 
domestic investors to safer economies in the developed world. 
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4. Economic Summary  
Given the recent rise in world oil prices and increasing revenues, one should not 
expect any meaningful economic reform, or turmoil, in Saudi Arabia in the near future.  
The regime wants to reform and diversify its economy for political, strategic, and 
economic reasons, namely, to reduce its vulnerability to internal and external threats and 
to ease the pressure caused by population expansion, increased subsidies, and reliance on 
a foreign workforce.  The infrastructure obstacles are enormous and include a lack of 
resources, high transportation costs, an under-sized market, and undeveloped educational 
and financial institutions.  The Saudi royal family understands the need to diversify and 
reform, but they do not have the political security needed to accomplish a serious 
economic transformation.  The regime is unwilling to take measures that cause hardship 
for its citizens and they have chosen, in the past, to borrow money and run budget deficits 
instead of instituting economic austerity measures.  Saudi Arabia’s ability to borrow 
during times of economic crisis and quickly repay its debt during economic boons makes 
it unique among rentier states and keeps serious political opposition in check.  However, 
increasing societal demands on their economy jeopardizes this ability potentially putting 
the Saudi regime in harm’s way.    
C. SOURCES OF DISCONTENT  
Extreme sensitivity to American influence in the region results in constant 
pressure on the Saudi regime to minimize the US military presence.73  The United States’ 
presence must be sufficient to deter aggression yet unobtrusive enough to avoid inflaming 
local populations.74  The Sa’ud family has always been able to either co-opt their 
opposition or keep them fragmented enough to prevent any real threats to their authority.  
Lacking any real political legitimacy, the Sa’ud family keeps tight control over its 
citizens and they cooperate because their livelihood is in the regime’s hands.  In short, 
they “buy” their way out of trouble.  Should the regime become unable to provide its 
citizens with the cradle to grave welfare they desire, their opposition to the monarchy 
could become unified and violent.  This situation could have serious implications for 
deployed US forces since they are closely identified with the current regime and anti-
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government protests could target American forces as past attacks in Saudi Arabia 
suggest.75 
The Sa’ud regime suffers from an identity crisis in its rule over the kingdom.  
There are constant challenges to the legitimacy of the ruling elite and major, polar 
opposition comes primarily from western educated elites demanding democratic reform 
and radical Islamic fundamentalists demanding an end to corrupt rule.  The regime is 
very skillful, and so far successful, at placating its internal opposition, but Saudi leaders 
are aware the US presence can inflame resentful populations.  The most broad-based 
source of discontent among the Saudi populace is the question of regime legitimacy. 
1. Legitimacy  
Political relationships in rentier states are fragile and inextricably bound to the 
ruler’s ability to continue the state’s welfare functions.76  As in most rentier states, the 
Saudi royal family cannot obliterate long-standing local affiliations or social groups that 
put cultural and religious constraints on their power.77  Saudi Arabia has no written 
constitution, no political parties, and no elections.  The King has supreme authority.  His 
primary political influences are family members and outside of this core constituency 
there is little opportunity for political participation.78  The dominance of the Sa’ud family 
has its roots in the 18th century and is a result of the collaboration between al-Sa’uds and 
the Wahhabi ulama.  The fundamental thread holding this diverse polity together and 
providing legitimacy for the regime is their outward adherence to Islam and their claim to 
be the protectors of the Muslim Holy Places.79  It is hard to image a nation commanding 
more of the symbols of Islamic legitimacy than Saudi Arabia—its flag even displays the 
shahada, or declaration of Islamic faith.80  
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Even though the regime espouses fundamentalist principles, the general 
population recognizes the discrepancy between rhetoric and actions.  After the discovery 
of oil, the Sa’ud family ensured Najdi tribes, Hijazi merchants, and the Wahhabi ulama 
of undreamed of wealth in exchange for accepting their political supremacy.81  The 
regime then brought the populace into the web of state patronage, weaned them from 
tribal and clan loyalty, and transformed them into state dependents.82  The wealth and 
lifestyle of the Saudi royal family has led to charges of corruption, un-Islamic behavior, 
and demands for greater political participation (especially in times of economic 
adversity).  This led the regime to seek stability through centralized political control and 
increasingly autocratic rule. 
Despite the formation of the National Advisory Council (majlis al-shura), King 
Fahd is essentially running a police state.83  Maintaining they are the “Champions of 
Islam” may be the Saudi royal family’s claim to legitimacy, but oil wealth is their key to 
power.  Even with popular discontent towards the regime due to its lack of legitimacy, 
the likelihood of a mass uprising is remote.  The Saudi people are, in the end, dependents 
of the state and rely on regime handouts for their livelihood.  Their opposition to the 
American presence stems from US support for an oppressive regime that provides no 
legal channels for political discourse or dissent.84 
2. Liberals 
Liberal opposition to the regime comes from western educated elites who call for 
democratic reforms within the Saudi government.  This front advocates increased 
participation in government but is not a unified, determined threat since it has an 
enormous stake in the current political situation given their ambassadorial and majlis al-
shura appointments.85  They do have an opposition ideology and stand to lose their status 
should the Saudi government implement austere economic reform.  This could increase 
liberal hostility towards American forces since they would more than likely see those 
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forces as the “custodians” of a regime that suffocates democratic reform and dialogue.  In 
that sense, liberals are prime candidates for co-option by the regime’s most dangerous 
opposition–the Islamists and Islamic militants. 
3. Islamist Militant Connection  
Religious conservatives are the core of the regime’s support and their claim to 
legitimacy.  They are also their most dangerous detractors and breed its most militant 
opposition.86  Islamic revivalists denounce hereditary monarchs as un-Islamic and view 
the Saudi Royal family as the corrupt custodians of the holy places.87  The regime’s 
efforts to act pragmatically and build a modern, industrialized state conflict with 
Wahhabi Islamic ideals because they are seen as increasing western influence in Saudi 
Arabia.  Dr. Safir al-Hawali, a radical Islamist cleric opposed to the Saudi regime and 
western influences, sums it up like this, “The west is our enemy forever and fighting 
them is an honorable duty for every Muslim.”88  Wholesale economic reforms could 
potentially boost the power of the religious conservatives by driving unemployed and 
disenfranchised youths back into the arms of their radical Islamic teachers. 
The minority Wahhabi Islamic militants draw support from a burgeoning middle 
class of unemployable youths who only have their fundamentalist religious education to 
fall back on in a harsh economic climate.89  While Wahhabi fundamentalists may be 
unable to bring down the Saudi government, they are able to destabilize it by 
withdrawing their support and removing the regime’s claim to legitimacy.  This is 
unlikely from the mainstream Wahhabi ulama because they depend on the regime for 
financial support resulting in weak, disorganized opposition.     
Even though Islamic militantism is a decentralized phenomenon and there are few 
signs of a cohesive opposition emerging from radical militant movements, they all agree 
the Saudi regime needs to reform and American forces need to leave.  They differ as to 
the degree of the former–ranging from increasing political participation to overthrowing 
the regime–but there is no disagreement on the latter.  Serious and disciplined economic 
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reform in Saudi Arabia requires instituting economic austerity measures.  This means 
fiscal hardship for many resulting in decreased financial support to the ulama (increasing 
and solidifying their opposition), increased unemployment (driving youths back to their 
Islamic educational roots), and a reduced public sector workforce (driving newly 
unemployed liberals to join with the ulama and demand changes within the regime).  If 
these opposition forces consolidate, one common interest comes to the forefront; they are 
all opposed to America’s military presence in Saudi Arabia. 
4. Cost of the US Military’s Presence 
One can see the cost of the American military presence to the Saudi regime in the 
amount of political opposition it causes.  The regime recognizes that in terms of internal 
threats, the presence of Western forces is more destabilizing to the Kingdom than 
Saddam’s tanks.90  Prior to the Gulf War, King Fahd won the support of the ulama to 
allow American forces into the country only after his bleak portrayal of the military 
situation.  The Wahhabi ulama view westerners as infidels, crusaders, and enemies of 
Islam and accepting their entry into Saudi Arabia was one of the most humiliating acts 
ever accepted by the Wahhabi religious establishment in its 200-year history.91  In 
announcing their decision, the ulama gave no justification from the shari’a; they only 
referred to the principles of necessity.  The royal family also pledged they would not 
grant bases or formally station non-Muslims in the Kingdom.92  The American forces 
now stationed there are a reminder to the ulama of their humiliation and the regime’s 
broken promise.   
Saudi Arabia views itself as surrounded by enemies and is obsessed with security; 
therefore, defense spending accounts for 20 to 30 percent of Saudi Arabia's national 
budget.93  Saudi Arabia is first in the world in per capita military expenditures and they 
are the leading world importer of high tech weaponry.94  Saudi Defense spending equals 
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177 percent of health and education spending combined.95  Saudi regime opponents point 
out defense spending is just another way for America to establish their domination over 
the country.  Between 1992 and 1999 Saudi Arabia signed arms agreements with the 
United States totaling 24.8 billion dollars out of a total of 28.9 billion dollars spent on all 
arms purchases.96 
Besides their own defense spending, Saudi Arabia shares the cost burden for 
maintaining US troops on their soil.  The Saudi regime spent an estimated 60 billion 
dollars directly helping fund the Gulf War and they have probably spent the same amount 
indirectly since then.97  In 1997, the US received over 200 million dollars in offset costs 
from Saudi Arabia.  With a monthly price tag of 67 million dollars to enforce the 
Northern and Southern No-Fly Zones, Saudi Arabia can expect more bills in the mail.98  
Iraq expert Phebe Marr stated this about the Saudi government’s burden sharing 
responsibilities, “Looming far larger than either the Iranian or Iraqi threat is ‘sticker 
shock’ from the costs of defense.”99 
The many sources of discontent within Saudi Arabia all have a reason to oppose 
the American military presence.  The Saudi regime has always relied on the “power of 
the purse” to quiet dissent but that power is steadily eroding and could disappear 
altogether should the regime implement real economic reform.  Fragile regimes, more 
concerned with internal security than with aggression from their northern gulf neighbors, 
may conclude the US military’s presence entails risks to internal security that outweighs 
the security they provide against external aggression.100  The mass Saudi population 
fears US influence and dislikes infidels on Muslim holy land.  Western educated liberals 
stand to lose out under reform and could side with the more radical elements of society 
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against the US presence.  The ulama, co-opted and fragmented for now, are ideologically 
opposed to the western presence and stand to lose financially under disciplined economic 
reform measures.  This loss of financial power could give momentum to radical Islamist 
elements focused on uprooting the Sa’ud monarchy. 
D. DANGER SIGNS 
Tensions in Saudi Arabia have not yet spawned large-scale unrest, but anti-
American sentiment became tragically clear after the OPM/SANG and Khobar Towers 
bombings killed 24 US servicemen.101  In the aftermath of the Dhahran bombing, then 
Secretary of Defense William Perry admitted the dangers US troops face saying, “I 
believe we have to be prepared for more attacks on our forces not only in Saudi Arabia 
but throughout the Persian Gulf region.”102  Former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia 
Richard Murphy characterized the “great” probability of further terrorism as “an 
inescapable consequence of the role we have assigned to ourselves as the principal 
guarantor of security and stability in the region.”103 
Saudi Arabia remains the dominant political actor among the traditional states of 
the region and plays a key role in the US strategy for regional influence.  With the recent 
increase in world oil prices and revenue, there is no imminent risk of internal instability 
in the Kingdom.  The Saudi economy is, however, experiencing a population expansion 
that is outpacing GDP development and straining its patronage based welfare system 
making the regime look for ways to reform its economy. 
The Khobar Towers bombing and the attack on the USS Cole, among others, 
demonstrates the presence of a violent element within the region capable of carrying out 
attacks against US military targets.  The Saudi regime is able, for the most part, to keep 
opposition fragmented and suppressed by controlling their financial well-being.  This is 
becoming increasingly burdensome as the cost of maintaining the current economic 
system increases.  As the Saudi government seeks to scale down the public sector 
workforce, reduce unemployment and migrant labor, and increase private investment, 
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more Saudi nationals will face the choice of chronic unemployment or decreased prestige 
from working in low-paying private sector jobs.  The likelihood of Saudi Arabia 
successfully transitioning to a private market based economy is remote given their lack of 
will to institute reforms and the number of infrastructure obstacles they must overcome.  
Should the regime decide, however, to undertake austere economic reforms, it should 
signal danger for US forces stationed in Saudi Arabia. 
 Trimming the public sector, cutting subsidies, and forcing workers into 
undesirable private sector jobs will consolidate the now fragmented opposition and could 
lead to a more focused and powerful political foe.  The danger for US military forces on 
the peninsula is they are easily accessible and their removal is the one thing all opposition 
forces agree on regardless of the reason.  The moderate sectors of society stand to lose 
under any economic reform measures which could cause them to become more active, or 
at least complacent, in terrorist attacks on American targets.  Given what the regime 
stands to lose through economic reform, it is unlikely the Saudi government will 
wittingly institute any significant reform programs.  However, if the state loses its ability 
to dispense economic largesse, the social contract may be renegotiated under conditions 
where “buying out” is no longer possible and an intifah inescapable.104  If the economic 
and political situations dictate comprehensive reform efforts within Saudi Arabia, US 










                                                 


























III. DUAL CONTAINMENT 
A. POLICY MALFUNCTIONS  
Unilateral US sanctions enforcement, coupled with the United States’ role in the 
Middle East Peace Process, increases Arab opposition to the US military presence in the 
region.  This could increase popular collaboration for militant terrorist attacks against US 
forces in Saudi Arabia in an effort to expedite their withdrawal and decrease US regional 
influence.  It is unlikely, however, that America’s Dual Containment policy will lead to 
state sponsorship of terrorists attacks against US forces given the propaganda value this 
policy provides to these governments.  Decreasing international sanctions support makes 
US political and military actions appear self-serving and contradictory.  Iran and Iraq 
gain an enormous propaganda advantage—which translates into political pressure on 
regional regimes—from exploiting the sanctions rift between America and the 
international community.   
B. IRAQ 
Over the last two decades, Saddam Hussein’s regime has clearly proven to be the 
most dangerous threat to gulf Arabs and Iranians alike.  Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait a 
decade ago put gulf monarchies on notice that Iraq, under Saddam, was a threat which 
made them less reluctant to enter into security arrangements with the United States.  
While America’s military presence provides security for gulf monarchies, it does not 
enforce sanctions and comes at a significant political price for the Saudi regime.  Since 
UN sanctions are the primary justification for keeping US troops in place, many in the 
gulf region would like to see them abolished if for no other reason than to eliminate the 
need for America’s military presence.   
Iraq threatens US security policy and national interests (maintaining control of oil 
resources through friendly allies) in the Gulf.  Saddam Hussein brought on the current 
state of affairs through his own misdeeds; however, over the last decade, the 
overwhelming opposition to Saddam Hussein’s regime has dwindled and in some cases 
turned to outward support.  Almost all gulf countries say they support lifting sanctions 
against Iraq.  Even Kuwait, the one country most threatened by a re-emerging Iraq, says it 
supports lifting sanctions.  This is only an outward gesture as Kuwait stipulates Iraq must 
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apologize for invading their country—a concession they know they will never get.  One 
fact is clear, most countries in the region and many outside, namely Russia, France, and 
China, are anxious to re-establish trade relations with Iraq’s populous, oil-rich market.  
As more countries clamor to do business with Iraq, hard-line US sanctions policy and 
NFZ enforcement, the rasion d’etre for the US military presence in Saudi Arabia, 
becomes abhorrent to regional opposition forces.  This section will review United 
Nations’ sanctions against Iraq, how Saddam maneuvers around sanctions with the help 
of regional states, and Iraq’s links to Islamic militants. 
1. Economic Realities and Regional Perceptions 
Over the last decade, Iraq earned its share of UN Security Council Resolutions 
(UNSCR) condemning its actions.  The most comprehensive UN resolution in the 
struggle against Iraq, and the one the United States points to most often to highlight Iraqi 
disregard for accepted norms of international behavior, is UNSCR 687.  The UN Security 
Council passed UNSCR 687 in April 1991 approving a formal cease-fire with Iraq.105  It 
also called for Iraq to renounce and condemn terrorism, repatriate all Kuwaiti prisoners of 
war, and return ceased and stolen property.106  In addition, it established a war 
reparations fund for Kuwait, called for arms and economic embargoes against Iraq, and 
established a border demarcation line and demilitarized zone (DMZ) between Kuwait and 
Iraq.107  Most importantly, Article 22 of the resolution called for the eradication of Iraq’s 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including: chemical, biological, and nuclear 
weapons.108  Also, Iraq was to accept intrusive inspections to prevent any further WMD 
development.109  This resolution established the most comprehensive and controversial 
sanctions against Iraq.  Preventing smuggling operations into and out of Iraq via Jordan 
and Turkey is the principal dilemma facing United Nations’ sanctions enforcement 
against Iraq.  United Nations’ border inspectors can only inspect trucks designated as part 
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of the UN oil-for-food program and have no mandate to review the contents of a vast 
majority of trucks entering or exiting the country.110  Inspectors estimate they inspect 
one truck in 200 passing through checkpoints in Turkey and one in 20 from Jordan.111  
Besides the economic necessities of neighboring countries, a decade of failed sanctions 
has brought on “sanctions fatigue” prompting many countries to re-establish political and 
economic ties with Iraq. 
America is loosing the propaganda war with Iraq as a growing number of Arabs 
ignore the reality of Saddam’s continued brutality.  The United States is progressively 
becoming the scapegoat for the Iraqi people’s suffering, and Arab states are reducing 
support for sanctions claiming they unfairly punish the Iraqi people for their ruler’s 
misbehavior.112  Russia, France, and China support this view.113  In 1997, UNICEF 
published a report titled Report on Situational Awareness of Women and Children in 
Iraq.  The report stated Iraqi women and children were suffering a high rate of 
pneumonia, malnutrition, under five mortality, polio, measles, and maternal mortality.114  
There has been a lot of debate over the validity of this report and its data collection 
methods; however, the real importance of this report is many in the region want to accept 
the assertion that America, through its hard-line stand on sanctions, is causing the Iraqi 
people to suffer.  This makes the “Arab street” more rebellious and harder to control for 
many of the gulf regimes. 
While most Arab leaders hate Saddam, they prefer to maintain the status quo 
rather than confront him or deal with a new leader in Baghdad.115  Typically, their 
motivation for lifting sanctions is to re-establish economic ties with Iraq’s lucrative 
market, maintain internal stability, or both.  They see that after a decade, sanctions have 
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not brought about the desired changes in Iraq and Saddam’s grip on power is as strong as 
ever.116  Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain have spoken out about the need to bring Iraq back 
into Arab political circles.  In October 2000, Iraq attended its first Arab League meeting 
in over a decade.117  With support for sanctions dwindling, the issue of No-Fly Zones 
comes to the opposition forefront. 
America, not the UN Security Council, established the northern NFZ soon after 
the cease-fire in 1991 and the southern NFZ in August 1992.118  No-Fly Zone 
enforcement is the reason for the US military’s presence in Saudi Arabia and involves 
over 200 US aircraft conducting over 1,000 sorties a month at a cost nearing one billion 
dollars annually.119  The original intent of the No-Fly Zones was to protect the 
indigenous Iraqi Kurdish population in the north and Shi’a population in the south.  No-
Fly Zone enforcement suffers from deteriorating support and challenges they are 
American efforts to infringe on Iraq’s sovereignty.  Since NFZs do not enforce UN 
sanctions, many nations call their propriety into question.  Today, even the US military 
questions the way we maintain the northern and southern NFZs. 
Military commanders emphasize the inevitability of America loosing a pilot due 
to Iraqi anti-aircraft fire in the NFZs.  Gen. Franks, Commander of the US Central 
Command, and Gen. Ralston, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, recommended to the 
Bush administration a sharp reduction in the number of patrols over the NFZs because of 
the mounting danger that a US pilot could be shot down.120  Gen. Franks proposed 
reducing southern NFZ sorties while Gen. Ralston advocated ending northern NFZ 
sorties.121  The administration feels NFZ enforcement is necessary to prevent Saddam 
from using airpower against Iraqi minorities and to preclude an Iraqi force build-up that 
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would threaten Kuwait.122  Brig. Gen. Peck, Commander, 363rd Air Expeditionary Wing, 
the umbrella wing for all southern NFZ squadrons, adds, “If it is only No-Fly Zone 
enforcement, you do not have to be so aggressive.”123  While protection of US pilots is a 
paramount concern for these commanders, regional support is also becoming difficult to 
obtain. 
Gen. Ralston’s proposal comes as no surprise given the recent speculation that the 
Turkish government is reluctant to continue operating the northern NFZ.  The NFZ 
agreement, which is renewed every six months, was last renewed in June but the Turkish 
Office of Defense Cooperation, a liaison organization between the US and Turkish 
militaries, quietly predicts the end of the northern NFZ is near.124  The United States 
acknowledges Turkey is suffering economically by supporting UN sanctions and are 
willing to live with Saddam Hussein in their neighborhood.  Ankara, which re-established 
full diplomatic ties with Iraq in January 2000, maintain they cannot send an ambassador 
to Baghdad and continue to fly missions over Iraqi territory.125  In the south, a reduced 
number of patrols would allow for a smaller American “foot print” and prevent a large 
US profile from becoming a lightening rod for domestic discontent within the Gulf 
States.126  The desire to improve their economies has led some countries to re-establish 
economic ties with Iraq while many more wait in line to do the same.  This renders 
sanctions almost completely ineffective. 
2. Increased Trade Relations 
Countries around the world are becoming frustrated with America’s hard-line 
stand on Iraqi sanctions.  Europeans are irritated with US Dual Containment policy and 
feel it goes beyond the dictates of UNSCR 687.  This is due to the United States’ 
insistence that Iraq comply with all UNSCRs, vice complying with just the provisions of 
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UNSCR 687, before they agree to lift sanctions.127  Within the region, Arab opinion has 
turned against sanctions and singles out the US as the sole reason sanctions are still in 
place.  Arab businessmen point out the futility of sanctions enforcement since they are 
routinely bypassed—some estimates say by as much as $2 billion annually128—by 
neighboring countries whose economies are in desperate need of Iraqi oil, trade, and 
capital.  Jordan, Syria, and Turkey, Iraq’s financially troubled neighbors, find it 
increasingly difficult to abide by UN sanctions.129  This is due to Iraq’s market potential 
and their need for cheap Iraqi oil to help cover budget shortfalls.  Experts estimate Iraq 
smuggles about 100,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd)—totaling between $25 and $40 
million in monthly revenues—by trucking it through Turkey, Jordan, Syria, and by 
shipping it through Iranian waters.130  Jaques Sarraf, the President of the Lebanese 
Industrialists Association, points out, “Thirty thousand trucks pass each month between 
Iraq and Turkey.”131  Khaldoun Abu Hassan, former Amman Chamber of Industry 
Chairman, adamantly states, “Jordan’s loss as a result of sanctions stands at $1 billion 
annually just in overland and port trade.”132  Jordan relies on favorable trade relations 
with Iraq to make up for budget deficits in their stagnate economy.  Jordan’s treasury 
revenues from Iraqi oil sales alone exceed $330 million annually.133   
Saddam negotiated favorable oil deals with Jordan and Syria to get around the UN 
oil-for-food program and still makes over $10 billion dollars annually selling oil at 
market prices.  Even the US runs an oil sales trade deficit with Iraq—$515 million so far  
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in 2001, $6 billion in 2000, and $4 billion in 1999.134  The increasing need for trade with 
Iraq and the discontent of the Arab street isolate America in its stand on sanctions.  A few 
years ago, Iraqis blamed Saddam and the US for their misery, today, even in private, they 
blame America because Iraqis claim the US does not understand that after 10 years, 
sanctions are pointless.135  Even some of our staunchest allies inside the region have 
begun to seek trade relations with Iraq. 
Turkey recently reopened a rail link, closed for over 20 years, into Iraq to re-
establish trade and commerce.  Severed Iraqi trade cost Turkey $35 billion over the last 
decade.136  Turkey also has several construction contracts, estimated between $35 and 
$50 billion, awaiting UN approval to build roads, dams, and refineries in Iraq.137  Egypt, 
along with Syria and Tunisia, has signed a free trade agreement with Iraq,138 and Jordan 
remains Iraq’s main Arab trading partner.  Jordan is also studying the feasibility of 
establishing a duty free zone along their border and Iraqi officials have made increasing 
economic ties with Jordan a priority.139  With this much interest from our allies, it is not 
surprising states typically opposed to US policies are also “beating a path” to Saddam’s 
door. 
Within the region, Syria, whose economy is in dire need of foreign investment, 
has increased trade relations with Iraq substantially over the last year.  As stated earlier, 
Syria established a free trade agreement with Iraq and trade cooperation is expected to 
reach $1 billion this year.140  In addition, Syria re-opened an oil pipeline between the two 
countries giving Saddam over $500,000 a day in oil revenues with potential revenues 
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estimated at $2 million a day.141  Analysts consider all other oil smuggling efforts 
“nickel and dime” operations compared to this.  Outside the region, some of the more 
vocal opponents of continuing the current sanctions regime are fellow permanent 
Security Council representatives, Russia and France. 
France openly opposes sanctions and has flown “humanitarian” flights into Iraq in 
violation of the international embargo.  French companies participate in Franco-Iraqi 
trade fairs and the French government has shown reluctance to enforce NFZs.142 Russia 
is also conducting flights into Iraq without UN approval and is intent on maintaining its 
long, close relationship.  Russian oil companies are eager to preempt their European 
competitors in the Iraqi oil market and have signed a $3.5 billion deal to rehabilitate Iraqi 
oil fields.143  Russia and France are also long time Iraqi weapons suppliers and Iraq owes 
France $7.5 billion and Russia $8 billion for past arms deals.144   
As more countries seek to normalize trade relations with Iraq, America’s hard-line 
attitude toward maintaining sanctions makes it the primary culprit, in the Arab mind, for 
the suffering inflicted on the Iraqi people.  Our most openly supportive allies remain 
Britain and Israel.  Even though many Arabs consider Britain the root cause of much 
conflict in the Middle East and Israel their mortal enemy, US power and military 
presence ensure America will be in the forefront of international condemnation over Iraqi 
sanctions. 
3. Saddam and Islamic Militant Support 
Saddam Hussein’s regime has always been secular and, one could say, un-
Islamic; however, Saddam has championed the one cause uniting Arabs and Islamists—
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Reports in the Arab press link Saddam to several militant 
causes—including Hamas and Hizballah145—and claim he is providing tens of millions 
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of dollars to finance attacks against US targets in the region.146  Saddam sponsored an 
assassination plot against former US President Bush in 1993 and supports terrorist attacks 
by the anti-Iranian Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK).147  Some reports link Saddam directly to 
Usama bin Ladin stating the two established “working” ties as far back as 1994.148  
Many reports allege to recount specific encounters between bin Ladin and Iraqi officials.  
One asserts Iraq’s ambassador to Turkey, Faruq Hidjazi, made it clear to bin Ladin he 
would always be a “welcome guest” in Iraq.149  This gesture was supposedly a reward 
for bin Ladin establishing the International Islamic Front against Crusaders and Jews 
during the height of the 1998 American-Iraqi confrontation over UN weapons 
inspectors.150  One cannot argue the logical connection between Saddam and bin Ladin’s 
mutual interest in removing the America’s military presence from Saudi Arabia.  Iraq has 
ties to many Islamic militant groups and has provided them with financial and logistical 
support.  For Iraq, the US forces in Saudi Arabia represent a prime target for attack since 
they enforce the NFZs over Iraq.  Usama bin Ladin and his various organizations and 
associates share this goal with Saddam, albeit on different grounds, and an alliance 
between these two divergent causes could prove mutually beneficial. 
In the past two decades, Iraq has started two wars, fired SCUD missiles into Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Israel, and used chemical weapons against Iran and the Iraqi 
Kurds; however, Arab rhetoric now blames US policies for regional instability.  Islamic 
Militants share a common goal with Saddam Hussein in seeking the removal of US forces 
from the Arabian Peninsula.  In spite of this, Iraq enjoys dwindling international 
sanctions support, lucrative smuggling operations, and favorable Arab public opinion; 
therefore, Saddam would be foolish to support a terrorist attack against US forces in 
Saudi Arabia.  Islamic militants will attempt to carry out attacks against American 
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military targets and Saddam can enjoy the benefits without being involved.  By holding 
America responsible for Iraqi suffering, Saddam is able to portray himself as a victim of 
American brutality.  Reports of a connection between Usama bin Ladin and Saddam 
Hussein are suspect at best.  Bin Ladin is capable of conducting terrorist attacks without 
external support and has no ideological reason to help Saddam’s secular regime.  
Saddam’s support of Hamas and Hizballah is unlikely to yield attacks against US targets 
in Saudi Arabia because these groups are focused on destroying the State of Israel.  
Saddam’s support for Islamic militant groups serves to increase Arab popular support for 
the Iraqi cause and highlights America’s “anti-Muslim” role in the Middle East Peace 
Process.          
C. IRAN 
Iran is arguably the most influential gulf actor with regards to power and security 
in the Persian Gulf and regional stability depends on Iranian cooperation.  American 
policy seeks, through embargos and sanctions, to weaken and isolate this “rogue” state 
making it a pariah in the international community.  In the last twenty years, Iran 
sponsored terrorist attacks, threatened to export its Islamic revolution, and developed a 
ballistic missile program which buttressed the United States’ accusations of Iranian 
lawlessness.  Over the last decade the US and Iran have made overtures towards 
normalizing relations, but the only change in US policy has been the establishment of the 
Clinton Administration’s Dual Containment Policy.   
Dual Containment, with regards to Iran, involves ever-tightening unilateral, trade 
restrictions that are increasingly proving to be ineffective, unsupported, and detrimental 
to American petrochemical businesses.  Iran is the largest market for foreign goods and 
investment in the gulf region.  They have established economic ties with several regional, 
European, and Asian countries that reject US sanctions because of the lucrative business 
opportunities the Iranian market presents.  With growing international economic interest 
in Iran, US sanctions do little to cripple the Iranian economy.  This section focuses on US 
sanctions policy towards Iran, the problems of enforcement, and Iran’s links to the 
militant threat. 
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1. Iranian Sanctions  
Unlike Iraqi sanctions, Iranian sanctions are completely unilateral and 
unsupported by United Nations’ Resolutions.  They represent American efforts to punish 
Iran’s regime for its international “indiscretions.”  During the May 18, 1993 Soref 
Symposium at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), Martin Indyk, 
Near East Department Head for the National Security Council at the time and future 
ambassador to Israel, spelled out President Clinton’s Middle East policy with regards to 
Dual Containment.  Indyk stated at the symposium, “Dual Containment is composed of 
unilateral and multilateral efforts designed to force Iran to conform to internationally 
accepted behavioral norms.”  Specifically, the policy is designed to make Iran cease its 
support of terrorism and subversion efforts against friendly governments, halt its violent 
opposition to the peace process, eliminate its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
program, reduce its conventional arms build-up, and improve its human rights record.151  
The policy allows for “authoritative dialogue” with the Iranian government and, in the 
words of the Clinton Administration, “gives Iran’s leadership a chance to make a 
strategic choice to change its policies in order to serve Iran’s interests in providing 
economic growth and political stability.”152  Dual Containment critics emphasize the 
significance of announcing this policy at WINEP, which Martin Indyk founded in 1985, 
claiming the institute is pro-Israel and the offspring of the American-Israel Public Affairs 
Committee (AIPAC).     
Since the American Embassy takeover in 1979, the US has resorted to embargoes 
and sanctions to influence Iran’s policies.  Dual Containment is no different and involves 
a plethora of unilateral and multilateral sanctions that grew increasingly severe between 
1993 and 1997.  So severe in fact, noted Middle East specialist Gary Sick contends, 
“These sanctions are more stringent than sanctions imposed against the Soviet Union.”153  
The Carter Administration implemented the first American sanctions against Iran which 
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did not increase significantly until 1993 with the introduction of the United States’ Dual 
Containment Policy. 
America maintains it does not oppose Iran’s Islamic regime, but it does oppose its 
sponsorship of terrorism and opposition to the peace process.  Dual Containment did not 
originally oppose trade with Iran.  Instead, it sought ways to prevent the Iranian regime 
from carrying out its “rogue” intentions.  The United States’ 1993 sanctions unilaterally 
banned arms sales, transfers of dual use technologies, and certain exports to Iran.  It also 
banned Iranian imports to the US and adopted diplomatic opposition to all international 
lending institutions providing Iran financial support.154  The ban did not apply to foreign 
subsidiaries of US companies nor did it prohibit private remittances from Iranian 
nationals.155  Multilaterally, the United States called on its allies to support sanctions by 
banning arms sales, dual use technology transfers, nuclear cooperation, international 
financial support, and limiting credit and aid.156  Within two years, America would 
tighten these sanctions to effectively cut off all trade. 
Without any significant triggering event, President Clinton, in May 1995, signed 
several executive orders banning all US trade and trade financing with Iran.157  These 
executive orders banned US companies from buying Iranian oil overseas, prohibited new 
investment by American companies, barred re-export from third countries of all goods 
and technologies prohibited from direct export to Iran, and stopped US persons and 
companies from approving or facilitating transactions with Iran.158  Former President 
Clinton’s executive orders were the outgrowth of his administration’s mid-term 
assessment of Iran’s political actions.  The assessment outlined Iran’s worsening behavior 
towards the 1994 peace negotiations, namely, its increased sponsorship of terrorism 
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directed at the peace process.  It also summarized Iran’s increased efforts to acquire 
WMD technologies and materials.159 
The executive orders also satisfied congressional pressure to get tough on Iran and 
answered European complaints of American hypocrisy in calling for international 
sanctions while still trading with Iran.  Former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl rightly 
pointed out the United States purchased one-quarter of Iran’s oil exports for sale on non-
US markets prompting him to comment, “It is American oil companies, not German, that 
export Iranian oil to other countries.”160  The administration felt these executive orders 
would give America a greater leadership role among our allies.161  Some analysts point 
to the political timing of these orders–1996 being an election year–stating the only 
international sanctions support the US enjoyed was from Israel.  They go on to state the 
American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) sponsored the legislation and 
President Clinton chose the World Jewish Congress to announce these sanctions two 
weeks prior to signing them into effect.162  Regardless of the reasons, US business was 
immediately affected as America’s CONOCO oil company was forced to renounce its $1 
billion dollar contract to develop the Sirri gas field in the southern Persian Gulf.163 
The United States’ again increased sanctions in 1996 with the implementation of 
the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), popularly known as the D’Amato Act.  ILSA 
imposes mandatory and discretionary secondary sanctions on foreign companies 
investing more than $20 million annually in the Iranian oil and gas sectors.164  The US 
Congress touted ILSA as a response to Iran’s continued sponsorship of terrorism and 
passed it by a unanimous 415-0 vote.  Congress sees this act as an opportunity to take a 
tough, public stand against terrorism.  Opponents of the act assert its real purpose is to 
help compensate American businesses for loosing out to foreign companies in the 
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profitable Iranian commercial market.165  Finally, in August 1997, President Clinton 
signed Executive Order 13059 reaffirming the prohibition on virtually all trade and 
investment activities by US citizens with Iran.  
On four separate occasions between 1993 and 1997, the United States government 
acted unilaterally to toughen Iranian sanctions justifying their actions by pointing to 
Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction program.  American 
pressure on allies to follow US sanctions–especially the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act–
continually meets with resistance and indifference.  The US enacted these measures at a 
time when many believed Iran had curbed its sponsorship of terrorism and agreed to 
abide by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) guidelines on nuclear energy 
development.  Recently, the US modified its position on sanctions with former Secretary 
of State Madeline Albright’s March 2000 announcement that the United States would lift 
certain sanctions on Iranian luxury goods such as rugs, caviar, and pistachios.  All other 
sanctions, she emphasized, remain in effect.  Several countries have already invested in 
Iran’s lucrative market and many more are standing in line to do the same.  
2. Sanctions Complexities 
The difficulty of sanctions enforcement against Iran is that the US has acted 
unilaterally to impose stricter sanctions while others seek to take advantage of a 
potentially profitable market.  One would expect difficulty convincing traditionally non-
allied and cash strapped nations, such as Russia and China, to support sanctions, but 
major opposition also comes from our long-time allies in the European Union.  Iran now 
enjoys regional recognition and international political-economic engagement.  With 
unemployment lingering around 15 percent and inflation rates around 30 percent, Iran 
needs foreign investment capital and hard currency infusions in their economy.  Several 
countries are anxious to fill this investment void because Iran is OPECs second largest oil 
exporter and their population–approximately 70 million–is almost two times larger than 
all GCC states combined.  Iran controls nine percent of the world’s oil reserves and 
exports 2.3 million barrels of oil per day.  Estimates show their natural gas assets 
represent 15 to 30 percent of world reserves, and over half their estimated assets are in 
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unexplored fields.  The business and profit potential for foreign oil and gas developers is 
enormous since this sector is currently under-developed.   
American sanctions against Iran have stung their economy but have failed to 
produce economic hardship.  In fact, some point out mullah economic mismanagement 
does more to harm the economy than US sanctions.166  When CONOCO withdrew its bid 
to develop Iran’s Sirri gas field in 1995, negotiations began immediately with an 
international consortium composed of France’s TOTAL, Russia’s GAZPROM, and 
Malaysia’s PETRONAS gas and oil industries to develop these fields.  When our allies 
supported a ban on providing nuclear technology and development, Iran turned to cash 
strapped Russia and their Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) and signed a $940 
million dollar deal to complete construction of a light water nuclear reactor in Bushehr.  
In March 2001, Iran signed a new arms deal with Russia reportedly worth $2 billion over 
five years effectively abolishing the Russian-American agreement not to sell arms to Iran 
after 1999.167  The US State Department threatened sanctions against Russia if they did 
not abide by the agreement, but Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev and his Iranian 
counterpart, Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, made it clear neither side was in the mood to 
listen to threats.168   
America has failed to convince its allies to take similar punitive measures against 
Iran and sanction success depends on allied support since they cannot succeed 
unilaterally.  Even with allied support, Iran is able to fill its needs by turning to cash 
strapped countries like Russia and China.  Germany, Japan, and Italy are Iran’s main 
trading partners and Indonesia, India, Brazil, and France are standing in line to do 
business in Iran.  All of them are glad to see America out of such a lucrative market.169  
The United States waived the ILSA provisions against the French petrochemical 
conglomerate in 1998 citing national security interests, but European pressure to forego 
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sanctions was the real impetus behind the United States’ decision.170 America, in the face 
of intense opposition from European and Asian firms, has yet to enforce the ILSA 
provisions against any country.  Hooshang Amirahmadi, President of the American-
Iranian Council, states, “The administration will either have to remove [ILSA] or 
reinforce it because the way it is being handled at the moment is an embarrassment.”171  
Our allies prefer critical dialogue and constructive engagement vice sanctions.  Given 
that Iran owes most of its $12 billion short and mid-term external debt to Japan and the 
European Community, these countries have no to desire to see Iran default on their 
financial obligations.172  
American sanctions against Iran are largely ineffective because they lack 
international support.  Many regional and international actors consider US sanctions 
punitive rather than persuasive173 and suggest they lack a definable end game.174  Iran 
represents a potentially lucrative market and many countries, particularly European and 
Asia countries, are rushing to do business in Iran and have vested interests in seeing Iran 
do well.  These countries are pleased America has kept US companies out of the Iranian 
market making US businesses the real losers.175  While Iran finds alternative markets for 
its needs, American sanctions, pursued unilaterally, have minimal impact.  Russian 
foreign policy analyst, Sergei Karaganov, sums up the international community’s feeling 
towards Iranian sanctions when he states, “Cooperation with Iran is all about making 
money.”176  Iran has also gained regional recognition and legitimacy thereby reducing 
some of the fears of its Arab neighbors.   
Arab countries of the southern Persian Gulf have always felt threatened by Iran’s 
size and military might.  This was particularly true during the early years of Iran’s 
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revolution because of their threats to export the Islamic Revolution worldwide.  Over the 
last decade, the Iranian regime has softened its revolutionary rhetoric and sought 
appeasement with its neighbors.  With Iraq’s emergence as the pre-eminent regional 
threat and Iran’s interest in regional stability, many Persian Gulf countries are less 
reluctant to engage Iran politically and economically.  Several countries including 
Turkey, The United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Kuwait have expanded commercial ties 
with Iran, and Iran enhanced their reputation among Arab Gulf States when they hosted 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in December 1997. 
 Hosting the Organization of the Islamic Conference was extremely significant for 
Iran since it gave them an aura of regional and international legitimacy.177  Saudi Foreign 
Minister Sa’ud al-Faysal stated the day after the conference, “The conference’s huge 
participation reflects the respect for the Iranian people and for the role of Iran, and the 
great hope for Iran to further improve bi-lateral relations, cooperation, and 
coordination.”178  To further expound on the significance of this event in recognizing 
Iran and its legitimacy, the Conference elected Iran’s President Mohammed Khatami to 
serve as the conference’s leader for a three-year term.  Iran used the conference as an 
opportunity to show a united front and reaffirm that they were not a threat to any Islamic 
country.179  In an effort to stimulate economic growth and investment, Iran increased its 
role in ensuring regional stability.  
 Eighty percent of Iran’s international trade and 100 percent of its oil exports 
transit through the Persian Gulf making cooperation, freedom of navigation, and stability 
extremely critical for Iran’s economic success.180  Iran is increasingly engaging its 
northern Caucasus and Central Asian neighbors.  It sees its northern neighbors as a large 
market for exports, an alternate route for goods to Europe and Turkey, a potential job 
market to help reduce growing unemployment, and, most importantly, a source of 
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international trade to generate hard currency.181  Iran is actively involved in maintaining 
internal and regional stability because outward signs of moderation attract foreign 
investment.  Iran is especially sensitive to the US military’s presence in the region and is 
working hard to remove any justification for maintaining it.  Iran is tired of the 
international community considering it a pariah state and, even with their outward 
opposition, seeks appeasement with America.182  The Iranian political establishment 
realizes US sanctions help maintain the current hard-line regime, but both sides are aware 
of the difficulties involved in normalizing relations. 
The first public signs of conciliation between the United States and Iran were in 
President Bush’s January 1989 inaugural address when he mentioned Iran saying, 
“Goodwill begets goodwill.  Good faith can be a spiral that endlessly moves on.”183  He 
implied America would reciprocate any act of goodwill by the Iranians.  Shortly after the 
inaugural address, President Rafsanjani won the release of the American hostages held by 
the Hizballah in Lebanon and remained neutral during the Gulf War.184  Unfortunately, 
the Bush Administration never overtly reciprocated these acts.185  America instituted no 
significant policy changes towards Iran until implementing Dual Containment and was 
patently non-conciliatory until the 1997 election of Iranian President Mohammed 
Khatami.  
President Khatami came to office with a moderate, reform agenda that the United 
States received enthusiastically.  President Khatami has taken a mollifying approach 
towards the US and in December 1997 called for a “dialogue of civilizations” and 
academic exchanges.186  After President Khatami’s comments, Secretary of State 
Albright seemed to make a conciliatory overture towards Iran by stating, “As the wall of 
mistrust comes down, we can develop a roadmap leading to normal relations.  We can not 
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view every nation through a single prism.”187  The United States is aware too much 
outward support for President Khatami is counter-productive to his influence and 
legitimacy, but when conciliatory overtures meet with continued sanctions and hard-line 
American pressures, it plays into the hands of the Iranian mullahs and erodes our 
sanctions justification. 
Khatami’s move to normalize relations with Iran’s neighbors and defuse hostility 
with the US has met with popular approval internally and externally.188  Conversely, 
Iranian hard-liners find embattlement and adversity politically useful because it allows 
them to blame their failures on US sanctions.189  During the December 1997 OIC, while 
Iranian moderates and hard-liners agreed Iran was no threat to Islamic countries, 
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei broke from President Khatami’s conciliatory approach 
towards the west and emphasized continued confrontation especially with regards to the 
peace process.190  In general, the Iranian population does not accept the hard-liner’s 
position but they hold it because it is the foundation of their legitimacy and provides 
them with a useful excuse to dismiss their economic mismanagement.  The US also 
points to this dissention within the ruling regime and uses it to forego any lessoning of 
sanctions because of the lack of “authoritative dialogue.”  With the hard-line mullahs 
wielding political-economic power and the moderate elected officials enjoying popular 
support, America asks, “Who speaks with one voice for Iran?”  More recently, General 
Powell addressed the Bush Administration’s view of Iran during his Senate Confirmation 
Hearings as Secretary of State, stating:191 
Change is happening in Iran because the people of Iran are expecting a 
little more moderation and a little more openness in their lives.  Our 
policies take into account the serious difficulties we have with their 
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offensive policies but at the same time encouragement to the people of 
Iran that the Iranians are not our enemies. 
America has followed its appeasing rhetoric with some action–it no longer 
considers Iran a leading sponsor of state terrorism, designated the anti-Iranian group 
Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) a terrorist organization, and reduced American gulf forces by 
one-third192–but it has not taken any significant measures to reduce sanctions.  Iran can 
“end run” virtually all US sanctions and our allies around the world prefer “constructive 
engagement” with Iran to take advantage of developing economic opportunities.  In short, 
our allies do not support American sanctions.  As Iran gains regional prestige and 
legitimacy because of its diminished ideological fervor and Iraq’s emergence as the 
GCC’s pre-eminent threat, regional regimes question America’s reasons for continuing 
sanctions.     
3. Militant Attacks 
Iran has sponsored attacks against American targets including the Marine 
Barracks and US Embassy bombings in Lebanon and their alleged role in the Khobar 
Towers bombing.  The basic foundation and ideology of Iran’s regime supports the use of 
Islamic militantism to achieve political objectives.  However, in the past twenty years, 
Iran has toned down its revolutionary rhetoric and worked to build stability throughout 
the region.  Sponsoring a terrorist attack against US forces in a neighboring gulf state 
would be counter-productive to Iran’s attempts to ease Arab fears and remove the US 
military.  There is little ideological connection between Iranian Shiites and the 
predominately Sunni militants, and, like Iraq, Iran benefits from militant attacks without 
being involved. 
While Iran circumvents American sanctions and builds international recognition, 
continuing sanctions will do little to solicit Iranian sponsored terrorist acts against US 
targets.  President Bush’s renewal of the 1995 sanctions in March corroborates this as 
America heard little to no response from Iran, the Middle East, or Europe.  Current 
sanctions are widely unsupported and serve to isolate America rather than Iran by 
keeping American business out of a developing market.  Iran’s opposition to the Middle 
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East Peace Process drives its support for Hizballah, and America's insistence on 
continuing sanctions makes US policy appear self-serving and contradictory to regional 
populations.  This further confirms, in the Arab mind, the perception of unequal treatment 
in America’s dealings in the region and could spawn increase popular involvement in 
terrorists’ attacks against US targets. 
D. OUR OWN WORST ENEMY? 
  After a decade, America’s military presence has become a permanent part of the 
Saudi security picture.  There have been no attacks against US military forces in Saudi 
Arabia in almost six years, and this can be attributed to increased Saudi internal security 
and the US military’s “force protection” measures.  After the Khobar Towers bombing, 
the US and Saudi governments moved all 3,500 US troops in Saudi Arabia to Al Kharj 
airbase in a remote desert area 60 miles southeast of Riyadh.  The US compound is a 
secured area inside the 80 square mile Saudi airbase.  All US military flights taking-off 
and landing at the base utilize tactical procedures to limit their vulnerability to shoulder 
fired anti-aircraft missiles.  These measures have surely thwarted terrorist actions, but 
should they ever become compromised, these forces become an attractive target for 
Islamic militant attacks. 
As “sanctions fatigue” sets in and many countries become anxious to re-establish 
trade ties with Iran and Iraq, American pressure to enforce sanctions isolates the United 
States.  Smuggling operations and decreased international support render sanctions 
almost immaterial while popular propaganda blames regional instability on American 
sanctions.  The American military presence in Saudi Arabia protects the gulf monarchies 
from Saddam Hussein, and it is unrealistic to think Iraq will stop being a threat to these 
countries.  Iraq maintains Kuwait is still their territory and got what it deserved in 1990. 
American sanctions will not prompt state sponsorship of terrorist’s attacks against 
US forces in Saudi Arabia because, in the end, they fail to achieve their objectives.  
America’s Dual Containment Policy, coupled with our support for Israel, makes our 
actions appear biased and intensifies regional opposition to American policies and 
military presence.  This becomes counter-productive to American interests since popular 
opposition can translate into political pressure on gulf regimes to remove US forces.  
With escalating popular support, it is unlikely either Iran or Iraq will risk loosing 
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cooperation by sponsoring terrorist acts in neighboring gulf countries.  Conversely, 
American policy increases popular opposition and could lead to popular support for 





















IV. WEDGED BETWEEN ENEMIES 
A. CONFLICTING POLICY  
America’s policy of ensuring the security of Israel and the continued flow of oil 
from the Persian Gulf is not “mutually reinforcing.”  America’s special relationship with 
Israel can cause friendly Arab regimes to buckle under the weight of regional and 
domestic opposition for their cooperation with “Zionist allies.”  America’s support for 
Israel makes Arab regimes question our commitment to their protection.  It also increases 
the very real threat of militant terrorist attacks against US military forces.  In militant 
terms, one cannot be “pro-Zionist” and “pro-Muslim.”  Islamic militant ideology, coupled 
with America’s “hegemonic” presence, puts militants at odds with Americans since they 
see the stationing of “anti-Muslim” forces near two of Islam’s holiest sites as an 
intolerable attack on Islam.     
American forces in Saudi Arabia are at risk simply because they are seen as the 
pre-eminent symbol of US “anti-Muslim” hypocrisy.  The United States has already felt 
“blowback” from its Middle East policies with attacks on the World Trade Center, the 
Pentagon, the OPM/SANG building, Khobar Towers, the Kenya and Tanzania embassies, 
and the USS Cole.  One can expect further “blowback” from American policy and 
presence since neither has changed and “anti-American” militant rhetoric remains as 
fervent and defiant as ever.  Consequently, the aftermath of these attacks—like the strikes 
in Afghanistan—can lead to further reprisals as US officials seek out militant terrorists in 
an effort to bring them to justice.  Muslim populations and regimes argue that this is an 
intrusion into regional domestic affairs and a continued attempt by America to humiliate 
Muslim societies.  American forces in Saudi Arabia are at risk, but how do American 
policies increase the risk of blowback? 
B. SAUDI ECONOMIC REFORM AND DUAL CONTAINMENT 
Since the beginning of the Cold War, America has portrayed itself as the 
champion of democracy and the free-market economy.  America is still the chief 
campaigner for worldwide democratization, political liberalization, and capitalist 
economic development.  In the case of Saudi Arabia, economic liberalization and popular 
sovereignty would be disastrous for maintaining the United States’ interests and ensuring 
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the security of US forces stationed there.  The Saudi regime’s dominance over their 
economy is the primary means by which they co-opt or eliminate internal opposition.  
Anti-American sentiment in Saudi Arabia has not yet produced widespread public unrest, 
but its existence became tragically clear after 24 US servicemen died in the OPM/SANG 
and Khobar Towers bombings.   
Saudi Arabia is the leading political actor among the traditional Gulf States and 
plays a key role in America’s regional policy.  While there is no near term danger of 
massive internal instability, Saudi Arabia’s population expansion continues to strain its 
patronage based welfare system and force the Saudi regime to look for ways to reform its 
economy.  The Saudi royal family, by virtue of its dominance over the means of revenue 
production, is able to keep opposition disjointed and suppressed.  Increased birthrates and 
stagnate economic growth place amplified demands on their economy making opposition 
control increasingly problematic.  The prospect of Saudi Arabia evolving into a market-
based economy is bleak given the number of infrastructure obstacles they must 
overcome.  Reducing the public sector workforce, trimming subsidies, and increasing 
undesirable private sector jobs could fuse opposition forces leading to the creation of a 
powerful political adversary that would most likely be Islamist and anti-Western.  It is 
unlikely the Saudi regime will institute any momentous economic liberalization programs 
given what they stand to lose.  A strong Saudi economy and the regime’s ability to co-opt 
or eliminate opposition are the keys to maintaining the security of deployed American 
forces. 
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America’s Dual Containment policy fails to achieve its objectives and serves to 
increase popular Arab sympathy for Iraqi and Iranian civilians whom they view as 
victims of duplicitous American aggression.  As countries rush to re-establish economic 
trade ties with Iran and Iraq, American pressure to continue or tighten sanctions only 
serves to isolate the United States.  Decreased international support makes sanctions 
increasingly irrelevant while Arab propaganda uses sanctions to blame America for 
exacerbating and prolonging regional conflict.  While American sanctions will not 
prompt state sponsorship of terrorist’s attacks against US forces in Saudi Arabia, Dual 
Containment, coupled with our support for Israel, intensifies regional opposition to our 
policies and presence.  With escalating popular sympathy, it is unlikely Iran or Iraq will 
risk loosing regional and international support for their cause by sponsoring terrorist acts 
in neighboring states.  The real threat to our deployed military is the role American policy 
plays in increasing popular collaboration for militant attacks against US forces.   
C. MITIGATING THE THREAT  
Indigenous collusion in planning and carrying out terrorist attacks significantly 
increases the likelihood this type of violence will be successful.  Anti-American 
sentiment is directly proportional to the amount of violence perpetrated against 
Palestinians in Israel.  The quickest means by which to ameliorate Arab opposition is for 
America to take a more even-handed approach in its dealings with Israel.  President 
Bush’s recent reaffirmation that America supports the creation of a Palestinian state does 
not change US policy, but it does put friendly Arab regimes in a position to support US 
strategy.  America must also maintain its support for regional monarchies since gulf oil is 
a vital national and international interest.  Any changeover in the ruling elite of these 
countries will likely bring into power an anti-Western regime significantly impacting our 
interests in the region.   
Islamist militants, because of their anti-western ideology and desire to overthrow 
unjust, un-Islamic regimes, will always be a threat.  While America cannot eliminate its 
support for gulf regimes we can diminish Arab resistance by reducing our military 
“footprint” and returning to an “over-the-horizon” security arraignment.  The US military 
presence in Saudi Arabia enforces the southern No-Fly Zone restrictions and functions as 
a lightening rod for Arab discontent.  Discontinuing flights over the northern No-Fly 
Zone would help Turkey re-establish economic relations with Iraq that would greatly aid 
its faltering economy.  By limiting the aircraft in Saudi Arabia to non-lethal 
reconnaissance aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, the US can monitor Iraqi activity, 
reduce its military footprint, lesson the threat to US pilots, and allow the Saudi monarchy 
to refute accusations it supports hostile American actions against its Arab neighbor.  The 
lethal response to Iraqi threats can come from aircraft stationed in Kuwait or carrier-
based aircraft in the Persian Gulf (i.e., from “over-the-horizon”). 
American forces deployed to the Middle East protect our vital strategic interests 
in the region and are at risk because of Islamic militant determination to drive the US out 
of the Muslim Holy Land.  This threat will not go away and America will never win the 
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propaganda battle in the Middle East.  Even if we ceased our support for Israel and 
eradicated the militant threat, our support for Arab governments would contribute to 
blowback since their citizens consider many of these regimes unjust, un-Islamic, and 
oppressive.  A reduced American military presence in Saudi Arabia would allow us to 
maintain our commitment to Saudi security, prevent Iraq from threatening its neighbors, 
and lessen the potential for terrorist attacks.  It also prevents Iran and Iraq from using our 
presence as propaganda to inflame regional opposition.  These are only marginal 
solutions to an extremely complex problem.  The real key to controlling popular collusion 
in militant terrorist attacks is ensuring the Saudi regime’s ability to co-opt or eliminate its 
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